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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
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a corporation; PROFESSIONAL
PHARMACY, INC. a corporation,
et al.
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
vs.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, THE DEPARTMENT OF
UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE
SECTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, et al.
Defendants.

Case No.
7390
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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
SURGICAL SUPPLY CENTER, INC.
a corporation; PROFESSIONAL
PHARMACY, INC. a corporation,
et al.
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, THE DEPARTMENT OF
UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE
SECTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH, et al.
Defendants.

Case No.
7390

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
From December 30, 1938, to January 3, 1944, plaintiff, James F. Robinson, was engaged in the pharmacy
business as a sole proprietorship under the name of Professional Pharmacy. About November 23, 1942, Robinson
purchased from James W. Reeve, a surgical supply business which he then operated as a sole proprietorship under
the name of Surgical Supply Center. The pharmacy
business and the surgical supply business retained their
separate identities and locations. Robinson continued as
manager of the pharmacy, and plaintiff, E. Wilford
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Brown, an old employee at the surgical supply remained
as manager of that business. Being war years and the
governmental agencies were anxious for immediate delivery of hospital and surgical supplies, and capable employees being difficult to obtain, Robinson was under the
necessity of devoting a considerable part of his time to
the surgical supply division of his business; and plaintiff,
Angus E. Ossman, was employed as auditor in charge of
the finances of both businesses. The nature of the businesses were so distinct that it would have been impossible
to successfully combine them. They were operated separately, each with its own separate personnel, trade
names, accounts, and locations; except that Robinson and
Ossman devoted variable time to each business. To avoid
misunderstanding between his two principal employees
and simplify the keeping of books as to the pay of Robinson and Ossman, a single partnership was organized on
January 3, 1944, consisting of Robinson, Brown and Ossman, which took over both businesses. However, separate
accounts were maintained for each business, and the experience rating is based upon the actual experience relation of employees to each business.
On October 1, 194 7, for practical reasons which had
no relationship to or connection with the matter of unemployment compensation or taxes therefore, two corporations were formed,-one, Surgical Supply Center, Inc.
taking over the surgical supply business and its assets, and
the other, Professional Pharmacy, Inc., taking over the
pharmacy business and its assets. This involved no difficulty as the businesses, books, records, charges and accounts had always been kept separate and distinct. Since
that time the employees, which under the partnership had
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been employed by each business, has continued so employed in the same business and positions under the two
corporations. The two corporations were and are owned
by the partnership, except five shares, one each by
Robinson, Brown and Ossman, who had been and are the
three partners, and one by each of two qualifying stockholders.
The experience rating of each of the businesses was
such that a reduced rate of contribution, to wit, .07%, was
in order. On May 14, 1948, defendant, Utah Department of Employment Security, notified the corporate
plaintiffs that beginning as of October 1, 1947, their contribution rate would be 2.7%, the rate fixed by statute
for an employer with no experience rating. (That is the
highest rate allowed by statute.) Upon appeal, the Appeals
Referee upheld the rate fixed by the department. The
gist of the decision of the Referee is stated in two paragraphs of his decision as follows :
"If it could be found that there existed two separate
partnerships which each transferred its assets to a
separate corporation and then discontinued operations, then the new corporations would clearly be
entitled to inherited status for the purpose of determination of contribution rate in this case. However,
the facts clearly show that the new corporations
that came into being on October 1, 1948 had a
common predecessor, the single partnership which
owned and operated the two separate businesses,
and neither of the successors acquired all or substantially all of the assets of this predecessor as .
required by the law to qualify for inherited status.
Appellants urge the contention that the corporations are successors to two individual businesses
which were maintained separate and distinct by
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the partnership but this is not sufficient inasmuch
as the businesses were merely separate units of the
single legal entity and were not separate entities
liable under the law in their own right but were
jointly liable as a partnership."·
The Board of Review affirmed, and this action
brings the matter here for determination.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS OF THE DEPARTMENT UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIES AND
ASSIGN FOR REVERSAL AND VACATION OF
ORDER WITH RESPECT TO RATES OF CONTRIBUTION TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFF CORPORATIONS.
1. The department erred in its interpretation and
application of the law in holding corporate plaintiffs
were not "qualified employers" for determining rates of
contribution.
2. The department erred in holding the corporate
plaintiffs had not acquired substantially all of the assets
of the employer, for the purpose of becoming a "qualified
employer" under the Act.
We contend that under the factual situation as it
exists in this case, and as shown and conceded by the
record, the two plaintiff corporations are successors to
two individual businesses, which were and always had
been maintained separate and distinct, although they had
both been owned and operated by the same partnership.
In other words we maintain: That for the purposes of
the application of Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 1947, and
particularly of Section 42-2a-7- thereof, under subdivision
C of that Section, the sale and transfer of the Surgical

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
Supply business to Surgical Supply, Inc., and the sale and
transfer of the Professional Pharmacy business to the Professional Pharmacy, Inc., in each case was in effect the
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of another employer, who, upon such acquisition, discontinued operation; that the new employers were thereupon entitled to
an "inherited status" as employers, and were "qualified
employers" for the purpose of determining contribution
liability, and entitled to reduced rates.
Section 42-2a-7, referred to as far as material to this
point, by subhead C of subdivision (c) provides that a
"qualified employer" (one entitled to reduced rates, based
upon experience rating) is one who was an employer for
thirteen consecutive calendar quarters, and for the three
years had filed all reports and paid all contributions required. It then adds :
"If an employer has acquired all or substantially
all of the assets of another employer and such other
employer had discontinued operations upon such
acquisition, the period of liability of both employers during such period shall be jointly considered
for all purposes of this section. (That is for the
purposes of classification and determining contribution rates.')
The Department of Unemployment Security and the
Appeals Referee held that plaintiffs, Surgical Supply
Center, Inc., and Professional Pharmacy, Inc., were both
new employers, and since Surgical Supply, Inc., had ac~
quired only the surgical supply business, operated at 331
South Main Street, and the Professional Pharmacy, Inc.
had acquired only the pharmacy business operated in the
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Judge Building, neither of the new employers had acquired all the assets of the partnership, and were therefore not entitled to the benefit of the experience rating
of the partnership.
STATEMENT AND ARGUMENT ON POINTS OF
ERRORS.

1-2.

Under proper construction of the law, plaintiff
corporations are qualified employers.

We contend such holding is in error, and is a misconstruction, misinterpretation and misapplication, of
the law. We maintain that the true and correct interpretation and construction of law is: that if an employer
acquire substantially all of the assets of the business which
he acquires, and the other employer discontinues operation in that field or line of business, the period of liability
of both employers shall be jointly considered. Essentially
the question is whether the statute is to have a critical,
super technical interpretation, or an interpretation in line
with the purposes, plan, and general purport of the Act.
If the words of the statute, without regard to purpose and
practical application, is to be the measure, then it is not
necessary that the acquiring employer obtain, take over,
or acquire the business, trade, organization, or enterprise
of the former employer. The statute says: "acquired
substantially all of the assets of another employer;" not of
the enterprise or business. There are many things that
are assets of a business, that are not assets of the owner
apart from the business, like "good will" which is inherent
in the business and cannot be sold apart from it. Utah
Idaho Sugar Co., vs. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah, 491,512,
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210 Pac. 106, 27 A.L.R. 84 7; 24 Am. Jur. 804, 5; Anno.
An.Cas. 1914 B, 874. There are many things that are
assets of the owner that have no connection with the business. Thus stockholders statutory liability to a bank is not
a bank asset of the bank and cannot be sold under an
order for a sale of assets. Andrews vs. Bank of Swea City,
242 N.W. 62, 65; Deareso vs. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 313,
154 S.E. 915, 920; Private letters Re Ryans Estate 188
N.Y.S. 387; a homestead right; an exemption from execution, and many others.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut in Harris vs.
Egan, 135 Conn. 102, 60 A (2) 922, 4 A.L.R. (2) 717,
held that organization, trade, business, and assets were
separate and distinct things, and one did not include the
other. Thus most statutes read "acquires the organization,
trade, business, or substantially all of the assets of another employer. California Statutes 1937, pp 2053, 4,
paragraphs 9 (a) and (b) ; Code of Iowa 1946, Section
96.19; so also Massachusetts, Washington, Colorado, Tennessee and many others.
Methinks defendants will say that "employer" means
the business and not the owner. With that we have no
quarrel, but that calls for· a liberal construction to fit the
sense and purpose of the statute, and not the words. So
to, "word interpretation" would provide trouble with
"employer," "operations" and "jointly considered."
Let us view the sentence in question in the light of
the purpose, plan, and purport of the Act; in the light of
the things and object sought to be accomplished by it;
what it sought to allow and what it sought to prevent.
Speaking of the meaning of terms and sentences in our
social legislation which enters new fields under new con-
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cepts, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
through Justice Rutledge in National Labor Relations
Board vs. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 64 Sup.
Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170, says they are to be interpreted not
through legal classifications and common law standards
'but with regard to the history, context, and purpose of the
Act, and to the economic facts of the particular relationship." The United States Court of Appeals, D. C. in
Grace vs. Mcgruder, 148 Fed. 121, 679, says the social
security act is primarily remedial and "requires construction which will give effect to the legislative intention in
the light of the mischief to be correctedJ and end to be obtainedJ and the taxing phase is secondary and incidental."
The primary purpose of construing a statute, the purpose
to which others must yield, is to arrive at the legislative
intent and render that intent effective. Such intent must
be deduced from the entire statute and every part of it
taken and construed together. One portion of an act is
often designed to extend, qualify, or limit or give meaning
to another provision. 2 Sutherland Stat. Canst. Section
368. Each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section. Inter-State Water
Co. v City of Danville, 379 Ill. 41, 39 N.E. ( 2) ----------------·
Not only the language but the evils to be limited and the
objects to be obtained must be considered. If it admits
of two constructions, one of which renders it reasonable and salutary in the light of the objects to be achieved
and the other renders it unreasonable or mischievous, if
not absurd, the latter should be avoided. Inter-State
Water v Danville supra; Burke v Ind. Com. 368 Ill. 544,
15 N. E. ( 2) 305. So, a situation within the object spirit
and meaning of a statute is regarded within the statute;
a situation within the letter is without the statute unless
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it is also within the intent. Burke v Ind. Com. supra; U.S.
Ind. Alcohol v Nudelman, 375 Ill. 342, 31 N.E. (2) 594.
Considering the statute in question from this position
we have here an enactment which manifests a legislative
intent that technical legal definitions are not applicable
to cases under this statute. Thus the \Vord "employing
unit" expresses legislative intent to deal with realities by
taking notice of economic and business considerations.
"Employer" is defined in terms of an "employing unit",
both of which with "employee", "wages", "surplus", and
many others differ from the usually accepted connotations
and common law concepts of these terms. Such terms and
many others are not used as word of restricted meanings,
and have no precise or rigid definitions, meaning or use.
The lexicon of the Act is in general descriptions, broad
terms, elastic meanings, uses and applications, evidencing
a legislative intent to brush aside or leap over legal barriers, and secure an interpretation and application of the
Act based upon economic and business sense, and not upon
rigid, common law or tax rule construction. See Unemployment Compensation Commission vs. Jefferson Life
215 N.C. 479; 2 S.E. (2) 584; Lindley vs. Murphy, 387
Ill .. 506, 56 N.E. (2) 832; Peasley vs. Murphy, 386 Ill.
258, 53 N.E. (2') 944; 143 A.L.R. 414; Godsol vs. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 302 Mich. 652,
5 N.W. (2) 519, 142 A.L.R. 910. This Court has in effect
taken the same view in a number of cases. See opinions
of Justice Wolfe in National Tunnel and Mines vs. Industrial Commission, ________ Utah ____________ , 102 Pac. ( 2) 508;
of Chief Justice Pratt and of Justice McDonough in Logan Cache Knitting vs. Industrial Commission -------- U t.
________ , 102 Pac. ( 2) 495. Bear in mind that the Depart-
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ment was required from the beginning to keep an experience rating on each business or employer; that the Act
provided that employers or businesses, after three years of
paying were entitled to have their rates adjusted, guided
by the calls on the fund that had been made by employees
of the employer because they were for a time unemployed.
Since the Act was to stabilize employment, the employer
was to be encouraged to maintain payroll stability, by reducing his rate of contributions as he kept- his employees
on the roll so they would not make calls on the fund.
Paragraph (5) of Section 42-2a-7 describes "Employer" under certain conditions so as to include several
employing units and to include two or more corporate
entities, if owned or controlled by the same interests. The
Legislature here made it abundantly clear that one employer may have several enterprises or employing units
and that all his enterprises are to be considered as one only
for purposes of bringing the employees within the Act,
but otherwise are to be considered as separate "employing units." Referring to "a form of reorganization affecting a change in legal identity or form "of an employing
unit reads: "(A) immediately after such change the employing ENTERPRISES of the predecessor employing
UNIT" (caps ours) reorganizing that enterprises or units
which economically or in reality constitute separate employing units shall be so considered, and enterprises or
units which economically or in reality constitute but a
single business shall be deemed a single business, familiar
rules of corporation law, partnership law, and the law of
master and servant to the contrary notwithstanding. The
case of Karlson vs. Murphy-Commissioner, 383 Ill. 436,
56 N.E. ( 2) 839, a brokerage business had passed through
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seven different partnerships. The Court on p. 442 of the
Illinois report says: "If each successive partnership be
considered as a separate and independent employer, plaintiffs are, of course, not entitled to the refunds awarded
them. If on the other hand, the terms "employer" and
"employing unit" employed in the statute, are construed
in an economic rather than in a technical legal sense, they
are entitled to the relief afforded them." After a rather
lengthy discussion of the terms the court goes on: "This
group of seven partnerships transacted business, and for
all practical purposes, so far as the public, the State, creditors, customers, and its employ~es were concerned, was
the same business unit." Again the court says: "The affiliation clause, the successor clauses, and the inherited
rating experience clause, fortify our conclusion that the
words "employing unit" are used in an economic and business sense. There clauses deal with matters of substance
rather than form. * * * * * manifestly the General Assembly did not intend the meaning of the words "employing unit" to be dependent upon the legal form of the
economic or business unit for whom the employee renders
service." and holds that the seven successive partnerships are to be considered and treated as one.
Meyer vs. Mich. Unemployment Comp. Com. 311
Mich. 440, 18 N.W. (2) 886, was a case where partnership succeeded to the business of Meyer, who became one
of the partners. The commission held this to be a new
employer. The court on page 887 of the Reporter says:
"Contribution by an employer is required for the purpose
of compensating for losses to the employees by reason of
unemployment. The rate of such contribution is, within
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limits, made to depend on the history of the enterprise
for unemployment which history is called the experience
record. The rate thus determined is called the experience
index, that is the rate indicated by experience as being
necessary. The experience index of any particular enterprise is to be computed as provided in Section 18 (c) of
the Act."- After referring with approval to Karlson vs.
Murphy, supra, where six successive partnerships were
treated as one emplayer, the court says : "We consider
the section in question should be construed with reference
to the words as used in their economic sense rather than
as strict legal phraseology.''
"The words in question "that employing unit" refers
to unity of enterprise and not to unity of ownership or
management. It is the matter of employment of the same
enterprise." The court then concludes that in consideration of the whole act the partnership was entitled the
benefits of position of the predecessor in determining what
it was to pay. (Italics added)
Certainly in an economic sense, in a business sense,
in a sense of the practical ways of practical men, the
sentence under consideration in this action would be
thought and held to mean that when a person buys a business from another with substantially all the assets of the
business he has taken over, the seller quitting such business
or operation, the buyer is entitled to the benefit of the experience rating established by the business he takes over.
Some businesses are periodic and fluctuating in the number of employees seasonally or otherwose; others keep an
almost constant roll. This is largely due to the nature of
the business. The spirit and purpose of the act is to make
each business, trade, or undertaking which has employees,
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bear the burden of the unemployment that results at t~mes
from its operation. It is not contemplated that one business which keeps a constant payroll shall carry the burdens
for one which fluctuates. That is the purpose of Section
42-2A-7 providing for rate changes based on experience.
Let us take an example: "A" is an employer. He
operates a hotel in Logan; a fair size grocery store in Salt
Lake; a lumber yard in Salina; and a sheep ranch at
Vernal. At each place he qualifies as an employer, with
an excellent experience rating at each establishment. He
sells the lumber yard at Salina to one operating a yard at
Richfield which also has a good rating. Under the contention of the department before the new owner could get
the benefit of the experience rating he must needs buy the
hotel, the grocery store and the sheep ranch. Is that sense
or sound in law, or in economics, or business, or practical
thinking in practical life? Yea, they go further: Their
position must be that if a man owns and operates a business, being an employer, and then incorporates himself as
a corporation sole, to go on with the same business, his
experience rating of .07% must be raised to 2. 7% for three
years. And that under a law designed to give each business
establishment the lowest possible rate based upon his payroll turnover. Alas, poor Yorick, I knew him well. P. H.
Vartanian, the annotator, on page 724 of 4 A.L.R. (2),
thus summarizes the transfer section of Social Security
Acts says: "The purpose of such provisions was to place
the purchaser of a business conducted by one who was an
employer under the law in the shoes of the seller of the
business, so that the purchaser would, in effect, be the
same employer as the seller had theretofore, and would
be entitled to any benefits accruing to the seller at the time
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the sale was made, and liable for any payments thereafter
for which the seller would have been liable had the seller
continued to operate the business; and that in such case
the purchaser in effect became the employer in the place
and stead of the former employer." (Italics ours)
The Connecticut Court, in Harris vs. Egan, 135
Conn. 102, 60 A ( 2) 922, 4 A.L.R. ( 2) 717, says: "The
theory obviously is that the business is to be treated as a
single continuing employment," and again they say:
"In applying the statute, a prime question in determining whether' substantially all of the assets,
-the organization or the trade or business was taken
over is: Did the acquisition result in a substantial
continuation of the same or a like business."
In the instant case it resulted in a perfect, complete continuation of exactly the same business without any changes
in control, ownership, accounts, keeping of books, personnel, line of stock, obligations or anything except the technical legal name of the employer.
As to what constitutes substantially all of the stock,
or property or assets, is a matter for the court to construe
and determine. In re: Temtor Corn vs. Fruit Products
Co. 299 Fed. 326, 31; U.S. vs. Whyel 10 Fed. (2) 260.
Rules or guides to determine the construction or application of the phrase are indicated in the Temtor case at
pages 328, 9; Lindley vs. Murphy 387 Ill. 506, 56 N.E.
(2') 832, 4. The term "substantially all' is elastic and
must be construed with relationship to its purpose. Loglici vs. Liquor Commission 123 Conn. 31, 192 A. 260, 2.
The meaning of this statute must be determined from
its purpose. The taxing element is secondary and inciden-
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tal. Natl. Rei. Bd. vs. Hearst 332 U.S. 111, 64 Sup. Ct.
851, 88 L.ed 1170; Grace vs. McGruder Supra; Cohn vs.
District Unemployment Comp. Bd. 167 Fed. (2) 883.

Further reasons why corporate plaintiffs should be
held to be Qualified Employers.
Our next point is that the plaintiff corporations are
not new employers; that they do not come within the term
of "an employer who acquired the assets of another employer." They are in truth, in effect, and within the spirit
and purpose of the statute the same employer~ having
merely affected a change in legal identity or form. The
partnership owns all of the outstanding capital stock of
the corporations except the qualifying shares. No new
parties can come in except by buying out the interest of
one of the others, the same as in the partnership. In fact
the partnership just changed the legal identity or name
under which the two employing units are operated. Such
change is not, under the statute, considered a change in
employer, or a transfer from one employer to another.
And the statute expressly provides that "effective as of
the date of such change in legal identity or form, the commission shall for the purposes of rate determinationJ transfer to the successor the payroll record and experience
rating record of the predecessor," and the contribution
rate shall be determined from the experience record.
Paragraph 5 of Section 42-2A-7 Laws of Utah, 1947.
We have no doubt the department will say that we
do not come within this paragraph, and so we present an
analysis of the section. As far as material here it reads:
"For the purpose of this subsection two or more
employing units which are parties to ****** a
form of reorganization effecting a change in legal
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identity or form shall be deemed to be a single
employing unit if (A) immediately after such
change the employing enterprises of the predecessor employing unit or units are continued solely
through a single employing unit as successor thereto, and (B) immediately after such change such
successor is owned or controlled by substantially
the same interests as the predecessor employing
unit or units."
The cases indicate that the requirements of such a provision is met by one employing unit changing its form or
legal identity into another form or legal identity, by reorganizing itself if the reorganized unit meets the requirements of (A) and ( B) .
In Maine Unemployment Comp. Com. vs. Androscoggin 137 Me. 154, 16 A (2), 252 the court quotes a
pertinent statement from Chicago, M. & S. P. RR Co.
vs. Minneapolis C. & C. Assn., 247 U.S. 490, 501, 38 S.
Ct. 553, page 557, 62 L. Ed 1229, as follows: "In such
a case the courts will not permit themselves to be blinded
, or deceived by the mere forms of law but, regardless of
fictions, will deal with the substance of the transaction
involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and as
the justice of the case may require."
In Unemp. Comp. Com. vs. City Ice and Coal, 216
N.C. 6, 3 S.E. (2) 290, the court says on page 292: "It
regards corporate organizations objectively and realistically, unencumbered by the fictions of corporate identity,
and thus brushing aside forms, deals with substance."
Godsol vs. Mich. Unemp. Comp. Co., 302 Mich. 652, 5
N.W. (2') 519, 142 A.L.R. 910; Meyer vs. Mich. Unemp.
Comp. Comm., supra; C. T. Investment Co. vs. Commission, 88 Fed. (2) 582.
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Here the surgical supply business, as an employing
enterprise of the partnership is continued through a single
employing unit as successor thereto; so also is the pharmacy business as an employing enterprise. So as to (B);
immediately after such change (and continuing to the
present moment) the very same unit, the partnership owns
and controls the successor employing units. We call attention to the language of the section, "THE EMPLOYING ENTERPRISES OF THE EMPLOYING UNIT,"
clearly recognizing that an employing unit may have and
operate several "employing enterprises," which is exactly
what the partnership in· this action did and is still doingan employing enterprise in the Surgical Supply, and an
employing enterprise in the Professional Pharmacy as contended for by us under subdivision (C) of part ( 2) of the
section discussed supra. This section also shows that the
legislature did not intend that employer should lose his
experience rating by changing his legal form. After providing that an employing unit may change its legal
identity or form as long as the new unit was owned or controlled by the same interest as before the change in form
or legal identity the section provides: "Effective as of
the date of such change in legal identity or form, the commission shall for purposes of rate determination transfer
to the successor the payroll record and experience rating
record of the predecessor."
It would seem that the Legislature intended that
each separate enterprise of an employer is to be considered
as a separate employing unit, except for the purpose of
including within the protection of the Act, employees of
such an enterprise which, for lack of numbers, would not
be covered into the Act. In such case the several employSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing enterprises of one employer, are for the purpose of
bringing all employees within the Act, considered as one.
The reason universally assigned for this joining affiliate
"employing units" for coverage purposes is to prevent
shifting of employees or pay charges where there is unity
of control. Re: Temtor Corn vs. Fruits Products, 299
Fed. 326, 9; Karlson vs. Murphy, supra; Lindley vs.
Murphy, supra.
That the Legislature intended that the Surgical Supply business and the Pharmacy business, when taken over
by the corporations, were to be treated as two separate
units for contribution purposes is evidenced by the further
fact that after the decision of the Department in cases
such as these the L.egislature in 1949, made the matter
definite and beyond further question, when they declared,
That when an employer who acquires substantially all,
or a clearly segregable or identifiable part of another employer's enterprise, the past experience rating of the enterprise sh.all go to the benefit of acquiring employer. Laws
of Utah 1949, Chapter 53, page 118. See Arado vs. Keitel
353 Mo. 223, 182 S.W. (2) 176; Lindley vs. Murphy, 387
Ill. 506, 56 N.E. (2) 832, 4; Billet vs. Gordon, 389 Ill.
454, 59 N.E. (2) 812; Meyer vs. Mich. Unemployment
Comp. 311 Mich. 440 18 N.W. (2) 1886.
We summarize the points and discussion:
The corporate plaintiffs are "Qualified employers"
because:
1. They acquired substantially all of the assets of the
enterprise of "employing units" they acquired.
2. For the purposes of the section here involved, enterprises which are in their nature and operation separate
are considered as separate businesses, or "employing as-
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sets" for purposes of determining contribution rates upon
transfer.
3. Since the corporate plaintiffs, the acquiring employers are owned and controlled by the partnership, the
former employing unit, the department erred in law in
holding that the corporate plaintiffs were new or acquiring employers in the matter of determining rates of contribution.
4. The organization of the corporate plaintiffs was, under Section 42-2a-7, just a change of identity or form
under part ( 5) of the section and therefore entitled again
to inherited status for determination of rate of contribution.
Under a proper construction and interpretation of
the statute, the facts show that for the purpose of Section
42-2a-7 -, the corporate plaintiffs are the same employer
as the partnership and therefore is a "qualified Employer"
and entitled to a reduced rate_ of contribution under their
experience rating index.
We respectfully submitted that the Order of the
Department of Unemployment Security and the Appeal
Referee holding the plaintiff corporations 'vere not Qualified Employers, and fixing their rate of contribution at
2.7% is against the law, is null and void and should be
vacated, annulled and set aside.
Respectfully submitted
Owen G. Reichman
Martin M~ Larson
Attorneys for plaintiffs
Received copy this ____________ day of November, 1949.

Attorney for defendants.
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